Heather Trickey and Ivar Lødemel

The Centre for Research in Social Policy (Loughborough) and

Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science (Oslo)

(Draft, please do not quote without permission)

This paper is based on work undertaken for the European Commission by:

The Centre for Research in Social Policy (Loughborough); Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science (Oslo); The Danish National Institute for Social Research (Copenhagen); The Centre for Research and Information in Democracy and Autonomy (Paris); The Centre for Social Policy Research (Bremen); The Department of General Social Sciences (Utrecht); and The Urban Institute (Washington).

Outline for presentation to ESRC Labour Studies Seminar

Background to the Research

This paper forms one part of ongoing work, funded by the European Commission (TSER), to compare European Workfare policies and is based on material from a forthcoming volume to be published by Policy Press - ‘An Offer You Can't Refuse. Workfare in International Perspective’ (Ivar Lødemel and Heather Trickey (eds)). The book details workfare policies in six European countries and in the United States and includes a detailed comparison of the schemes, their development, implementation and outcomes. The bulk of the information contained in this paper draws on material relating to each country contained within the forthcoming book chapters.

This paper presents a brief systematic overview of international variation in ‘workfare’ programs in seven countries; Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the US. The paper focuses on the extent to which heterogeneous needs amongst client populations are acknowledged and accommodated within the programmes as well as on the common issues which arise from a conflict between the existence of variation within client groups and compulsion for all to participate in fixed programmes.

A Change in Contract

In the last decade, the developed world has witnessed a shift away from unconditional entitlement to social assistance towards greater emphasis on obligations and conditions tied to the receipt of financial aid. As part of this process more and more countries require that recipients work in exchange for the receipt of benefits. Workfare is widely written about as just one element in (or indication of) the change from demand side to supply side forms of regulation. Whilst some writers distinguish between the different areas of change from passive to active welfare delivery; for example, ‘workfare’ vs. ‘active labour market policies’ (ALMP) vs. ‘activation’ (Hvinden 1999), others do not.

Workfare has always been a politically charged term and has fallen into political disrepute in all the countries covered here and over the last decade it has most frequently been used as a term of abuse by those who oppose policies which they perceive to be eroding rights-based entitlement to assistance (Shragge 1997). In Europe the word ‘workfare’ is often used by policymakers as a foil, to explain what the new policies are not. Only the political right in the US still use the term to describe policies which they advocate.

Lack of clarity about what workfare ‘really is’, has not prevented it from penetrating public and academic discourse. In the three largest US newspapers more references were made to workfare in the year 1995 than in the entire period 1971-80 (Peck 1999a). The academic literature bears witness to a similar trend. Of a total of 90 articles describing ‘workfare’, only 11 were published before 1990 (Social Citation Index). The use of the term in the academic literature reflects its ambiguity and the blurred boundaries between workfare and related policies.

The definition used here, ‘ programmes or schemes which require people to work in return for social assistance benefits’, has three elements:

workfare is compulsory

workfare is primarily about work

workfare is tied to the lowest tier of state assistance.

This definition has been used as a starting point for comparing the programmes in each of the seven countries which represent the purest current form of workfare – the programmes which exhibit the strongest ‘compulsory element’, the greatest ‘work relatedness’ and which are most clearly targeted to social assistance clients.

Programmes chosen to represent the six European countries are: Activation (Denmark); RMI based Insertion (France); Help Towards Work (Germany); The Jobseeker’s Employment Act (JEA) for Young People (The Netherlands); local authority schemes resulting from the 1991 Norwegian Social Assistance Act (Norway); and, The New Deal for Young People (The UK). In Germany, France and Norway national legislation is reinterpreted locally to such a degree that a different programme might be considered to exist in each locality. To accommodate this, an ‘overall’ picture of the programme (or set of schemes) is given from a national viewpoint and the extent of intra-national variation is indicated. Three states' programmes for claimants of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families represent the United States (New York, Wisconsin and California). The programmes listed are not representative of the totality of programmes in each country – for example, the three American programmes represent three of the most developed forms of workfare in the US.

On the whole the introduction and extension of workfare programmes into Europe is a 1990s phenomenon. However, whilst the United States, has is often seen as the originator of workfare policies, having a history of programmes going back to the early 1970s, there are important exceptions within Europe. Denmark has taken a pioneering role in European compulsory activation, and in Germany a provision for workfare was included in the 1961 social assistance legislation, though the policy largely lay dormant until the onset of mass unemployment in the 1970s.

Different Aims (Recognising Heterogeneity)

Lack of employment (‘worklessness’) experienced by population sub-groups is a common concern within all seven nations despite a range of labour market circumstances. Changes in the size and composition of unemployed and inactive populations; growth in the number of social assistance claimants; and, an associated rise in social assistance expenditure can be everywhere identified as key motivating factors for the introduction of active labour market policies, including workfare (Heikkilä, 1999). Active labour market policies have been taken forward in the context of a growing international consensus that these are a prime tools in targeting specific labour market disadvantage (for example, see OECD, 1994; EC, 1999a, EC, 1999b).

Despite the common reasons for rise in social assistance claims and common concerns about social assistance expenditure (Ditch, J. and Oldfield, N., 1999), the relationship between wider macro-economic concerns and programme objectives is not straightforward. In addition to economic considerations, the use of workfare is underpinned by common ideological objectives related to changes in the way the relationship between paid work and citizenship is understood and described. These have been made manifest in rhetoric through the concepts of ‘social exclusion’ and ‘dependency’ – insofar as they refer to exclusion from the labour market and ‘dependency’ on social assistance – and to changes in the contract of ‘rights and responsibilities’ between claimants and the state.

A range of different explanations for worklessness underlie the programmes considered here. Whilst architects of all the programmes focus to some extent on eliminating ‘dependency’ – which is the reason for them being compulsory, to different extents they also aim to tackle ‘social exclusion’ and, in some cases, low labour demand. This is reflected in the extent of focus on external-based as opposed to individual-based problems, and on ‘demand-side’ as opposed to ‘supply-side’ issues.

Different Target Groups (Admitting Heterogeneity)

There are very important differences in primary target groups between Europe and the US. Within Europe, the focus is on young unemployed people. Danish Activation stands out as the programme most intended to apply to people whose main reason for claiming is not unemployment. Programmes differ as to whether they are applied universally or more selectively to their target populations. The most ‘universal’ programmes are the Danish, Dutch and British programmes, with the German and Norwegian programmes being the most selective.

Different Strategies (Accommodating Hetrogeneity)

The extent to which programmes diverge from the idealised model of workfare outlined in the definition given above are a reflection of the extent to which their architects define the causes of worklessness differently, and, so, seek to accommodate the varied circumstances of individual clients. Different strategies are a reflection of differences in underlying ideological aims, and in attempts to respond to the heterogeneous needs of target populations. Three methods are used to accommodate heterogeneity:

Selecting suitable clients from within a wider target population.

Tailoring placements to individuals within the programme.

Applying discretion with regard to sanctioning policy.

Programmes show considerable divergence from an idealised workfare model. Indeed, with the exception of Norwegian workfare schemes, ‘work for benefit placements’ are not used for many clients, and when they are used they include features which move them away from a ‘work-for-benefit’ exchange. Work-for-benefit options are more likely to be experienced by clients with greater difficulties in securing work. Some programmes (Danish, Dutch, British, and Californian) include ‘education and training’ or ‘social activation’ as alternative means of provision for such clients. In addition, the Danish, Dutch, British and American programmes include a ‘case-management’ process, in order to tailor the programme to the individual clients. However, of these four sets of programmes, the Danish ‘Activation’ programme is distinguished from the rest in its emphasis on a long-term strategy and on human capital development, whereas the US programmes have greatest emphasis on providing routes for early re-entry into the labour market.

Common Problems resulting from heterogeneity vs. compulsion

Despite their differences, workfare programmes face a common set of problems that emanate directly from the fact that they are compulsory, work based and targeted on a population facing formidable barriers to work. If workfare policies continue to be expanded then it is probable that they will increasingly be used to target recipients who have greater and greater barriers to work, and who, in an earlier era, would have been considered unable to (or incapable of) work. In addition, the result of re-designating groups as ‘work-able’ and tightening work-testing criteria is that, workfare is more likely to be experienced by whole categories of previously ‘inactive’ recipients, as well as by individuals who might previously have been expected to fall into an economically ‘inactive’ group.

In all programmes where a range of placement opportunities exists, a social division of workfare mirrors the selectivity of the regular labour market. More job-ready clients, who have a better chance of being accepted by employers, are likely to be ‘creamed off’ and provided with placements that have a greater approximation to the ‘real’ labour market. The unproven effectiveness of these programmes for clients with severe barriers to work raises questions about the moral justification for their being compulsory.

Flexibility is limited within programmes which are codified and underlined by compulsion. As a result there is a limit to the compromises that can be made to accommodate individual needs. Case management approaches and intermediate trajectories provide means of trying to accommodate heterogeneity. Nonetheless, a greater range of opportunities is available to more employable clients. Less employable people are in danger of experiencing ‘exclusion trajectories’ or ‘sink options’ and of being recycled within programmes which bring them no closer to sustained employment. Within more decentralised programmes, the least employable groups in greatest need of assistance – people with multiple disadvantage, living in areas of lower labour market demand – may simply be ignored by the programme.

The objective of preventing ‘exclusion’ may be at odds with the use of compulsion if it leads to dropout or to an endless series of work-experience programmes. There is limited data about what happens to clients who have been sanctioned. This means that the consequences of the complete removal of benefit can only be assumed. Research from The Netherlands (see presentation by Henk Spies later in this session) reveals that compulsion can result in further marginalisation and an exacerbation of the problem of social exclusion. Where the primary aim of the programme is to reduce expenditure, ‘drop out’ may not be considered a problem in the short term. However, this does not take into account the knock on effects, which may result from the need to spend in other areas (for example, on health or law enforcement).

Centralised programmes which seek to be ‘integrative’, but which are underlined by a strong sanctioning policy, inevitably create tensions between the social work and policing role of programme administrators. The trade-off between the pressure to meet targets such as moving people ‘off benefit’ or even ‘into work’, and the requirement to provide a tailored programme, is unresolved and most problematic for administrators working with clients who confront many barriers to finding employment.

A further challenge to the justification for compulsion is that the quality and quantity of provision is not usually guaranteed, and may vary within countries. Within centralised programmes this may result in fewer ‘real’ insertion opportunities in the localities with poorer provision. Within decentralised programmes the disparity is likely to be greater, as local administrators adulterate objectives.

The acknowledged heterogeneity of target populations, the unproven success of compulsory work programmes with clients with many barriers to work, and the issue of potential variation in quality suggest that the following policy architects need to focus their attention on the following:

Providing for groups with multiple-barriers for employment;

Determining and guaranteeing participants’ rights; and,

Evaluating appropriately.

References

Ditch, J. and Oldfield, N. (1999). Social Assistance: Recent Trends and Themes. Journal of European Social Policy 9:1 65-76.

European Commission (1999a). Employment in Europe. Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission (1999b). Joint Employment Report. Brussels: European Commission.

Heikkilä, M. (1999). A Brief Introduction to the Topic. IN Linking Welfare and Work. Luxembourg: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.

Hvinden, B. (1999). Activation: a Nordic Perspective. IN Linking Welfare and Work. Luxembourg: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.

Lodemel, I., and Trickey, H. (2000). ‘An Offer You Can’t Refuse: Workfare in International Perspective’. Policy Press (forthcoming).

OECD (1994). The OECD Jobs Study. Paris: OECD

Peck, J. (1998) ‘Workfare, a geopolitical etymology’ Environment and planning D Society and Space. Volume 16, pg 133-160: London.

Shragge, E. (Ed) (1997) ‘Workfare: Ideology for a New Underclass’ Garamond Press: Toronto.

Spies, H. (1996). Workfare: Emancipation or Marginalisation? IN. M.P.M. de Goede, P.M. de Klaver, J.A.C. van Ophem, C.H.A. Verhaar, A. De Vries (ed.), Youth: Unemployment, Identity and Policy. Altershot: Avebury, pp. 191-212.